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Aphorism 257 
 
by Jeff Kort 
 
(Honors Philosophy 1100) 
 
 
 
n the past, every elevation of the type 'human being' was achieved by an aristocratic society 
– and this will always be the case: by a society that believes in a great ladder of hierarchy 
and value differentiation between people and that requires slavery in one sense or another.  
Without the grand feeling of distance that grows from inveterate class differences, from the ruling 
cast's constant view downwards onto its underlings and tools, and from its equally constant practice 
in obeying and commanding, in holding down and holding at arms length – without this grand 
attitude, that other, more mysterious attitude could never exist, that longing for ever greater distances 
within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more far-flung, extensive, spacious inner 
states, in short, the elevation of the type 'human being', the continual 'self-overcoming of the human', 
to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense.  To be sure, we must not give in to any humanitarian 
delusions about these aristocratic societies' historical origins (that is, about the preconditions for that 
elevation of the type 'human'): the truth is harsh.  Let us not mince words in describing to ourselves 
the beginnings of every previous higher culture on earth!  People who still had a nature that was 
natural, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, predatory humans, whose strength of will and 
desire for power were still unbroken, threw themselves upon the weaker, more well-behaved, 
peaceable, perhaps trading or stockbreeding races, or upon old, crumbling cultures whose remaining 
life-force was flickering out in a brilliant fireworks display of wit and depravity.  At the beginning, 
the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: its dominance was not due to its physical strength 
primarily, but rather to its spiritual – these were the more complete human beings (which at every 
level also means the ‗more complete beasts‘). 
In this paper I will analyze aphorism 257 in Nietzsche's book Beyond good and evil.  This 
aphorism is the first one in the chapter entitled ―What is Noble‖ and is the beginning to Nietzsche's 
discussion on the slave and noble moralities.  The focus of the analysis will be on the aphorism and 
its content.  The analysis does not cover the overall topic of the chapter or Nietzsche's entire 
discussion on morality.  After the analysis, I will respond with my own thoughts on the aphorism by 
explaining what parts I agree/disagree with and why.  While reading this analysis and response, it is 
important to keep in mind that Nietzsche is widely open to interpretation because he does not use the 
structure of  philosophical arguments, but instead uses several different writing techniques (such as 
aphorisms) to communicate his message. 
In aphorism 257, Nietzsche explains his view on the history of the noble human being and 
gives a historical based critique on contemporary morals, but what exactly does he mean by noble 
human?  He means a superior, more sophisticated human.  A human that is better than other humans 
because of who he is and the way he acts.  The noble human knows he is better, not because other 
people tell him he is, but because he knows he is. The noble human also makes his own morality 
based on his own judgment or as Nietzsche says in aphorism 260 ―the noble type of person feels 
himself as determining the value, he does not need approval‖ (Nietzsche, pg 154).  This value is 
essentially the main point about his noble human which is described in this aphorism as a ―grand 
feeling of difference‖ needed  to further human existence.  Nietzsche does not support the idea with 
structured arguments, but instead, affirms it.  (Nietzsche, pg 151). 
If the aristocratic noble class does not have a ―grand feeling of difference‖ they will not be 
able to move beyond their current existence for ―ever greater distances within the soul itself‖ 
―I 
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(Nietzsche, pg 151).  Nietzsche claims that the noble class wouldn't think it necessary to look inward, 
and that they wouldn't be able to without the separation which means that they wouldn't practice 
philosophy.  The conditions would not be right.  He makes his claim from a historical basis, saying 
that in ―the past, every elevation of the type of 'human being' was achieved by an aristocratic society‖ 
(Nietzsche, pg 151).  He is clearly referring to the philosophers of ancient Greek society and their 
methods of treating their slaves like tools, which is something he places as being a part of this ―grand 
feeling of difference‖ which (in part) comes ―from the ruling caste's constant view downwards onto 
its underlings and tools‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151).  This ―grand feeling of difference‖ is not only about the 
necessity for the gap, but it is also important for the mindset of the noble classes (Nietzsche pg 151).  
He thinks that the gap can't only physically exist, but it also must be accepted in the minds of the 
noble class.  
What are the classes that Nietzsche is referring to?  He is talking about differing moralities 
that the noble and slave classes have, which he calls noble and slave moralities respectively.  But, 
what are these moralities?  As I have already stated, Nietzsche thinks that a person with noble 
morality will think about morality as ―the noble type of person feels himself as determining the 
value, he does not need approval‖ (Nietzsche, pg 154).  The noble person is in a sense making his 
own morality that he does not have to justify to others. The noble person realizes to have this power. 
Nietzsche says, ―The noble person reveres the power in himself, and also his power over himself‖ 
(Nietzsche, pg 154).  It is a self- serving, self-determining power. 
But how should one understand the opposite morality (slave morality)?  Slave morality is 
basically the opposite to noble morality; where noble morality is about empowerment, Nietzsche says 
that ―slave morality is essentially a morality of utility‖ (Nietzsche, pg 156).  Someone with slave 
morality is suspicious of those above him as Nietzsche says ―they will probably express a pessimistic 
suspicion about the whole human condition, and they might condemn the human being along with 
the condition.‖(pg 155) The slave ―is keenly distrustful of everything that the powerful revere as 
'good'‖ (pg 155).  So Nietzsche argues that the slave morality is a morality that lacks overall focus, 
that doesn't revere power, but is distrustful of it.  Ambition is not a part of the slave morality as it 
suppresses others. 
Nietzsche makes a second claim in this aphorism that expands on the first one.  Again, he is 
making this claim from a historical basis, but in this case he is writing about the origins of 
aristocratic societies.  He claims that they were all originally barbarians that suppressed more passive 
peoples.  He knows that for readers the word barbarian will initially evoke thoughts of uncivil 
behavior, but Nietzsche actually means it as a positive thing (in a way). He is intentionally using 
provocative language because he wants his readers to pay attention.  He even says ―we must not give 
into any humanitarian delusions about these aristocratic societies' origins‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151).  In 
this statement, he is openly calling anyone who has some idealistic notion of Europe's history as 
being delusional.  He says that the barbarians ―dominance was not due to their physical strength 
primarily, but rather to its spiritual – these were the more complete human beings (which at every 
level means more complete beasts‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151).  He argues that they are more natural people 
because of their dominating will.  They are more aggressive than their neighbors and conquer and 
subjugate them, which Nietzsche thinks makes them more in line with nature.  What does he actually 
mean by success and in-line with nature?  He is criticizing contemporary morality, specifically 
Christian morality.  He argues that European civilization did not get to the point it was at (nineteenth 
century) because of following Christian virtues. Instead, he claims that humans got that way because 
the European civilizations dominated everyone around them.  The Europeans weren't being humble, 
kind, empathetic or any of the other accepted Christian virtues.  He claims that they were doing the 
opposite.  Taking these two claims together, Nietzsche makes a serious critique about Christian 
morality.  This means that philosophical thought could have only come about from a noble class 
doing the opposite of acceptable Christian practices.  He openly cites barbaric behavior as being a 
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―precondition‖ by saying ―we must not give into any humanitarian delusions about these aristocratic 
societies' origins (that is, about the preconditions for the type 'human')‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151). 
I cannot deny that every philosophical culture came from this aggressive origin that 
Nietzsche is referring to.  I am unable to think of any that we wouldn't consider to be barbaric at 
some level or another from a modern perspective.  This is probably because our perspective in part 
ties in with Christian morality, and we as modern people, see some of the practices (the ones that 
Nietzsche is talking about) as being barbaric and morally wrong.  We see these acts, such as taking a 
neighbor‘s property, as being bad because of their very nature, as they seek to subjugate others for 
their own empowerment, and this is the opposite of what is considered Christian virtues.  Those 
using noble morality considered themselves separate human beings from other cultures, and thus 
achieved the ―grand feeling of difference‖ in order to reach the level that they did.  I understand this 
view of history, and can't argue with this historical basis.  That ―grand feeling of difference‖ that 
separates the two moralities is a part of philosophy, as Laurence Lampert says about Nietzsche 
avocation of slavery ‗just as Nietzsche's advocacy of cruelty must be understood in that most 
spiritual sense, so must his advocacy of slavery.  It belongs to our species to live enslaved – to 
―truths‖ or opinions that define the horizon within which life is experienced‘ (Lampert, pg 266).  The 
nobles must separate themselves, as Nietzsche thinks they have.  I do not argue with this idea in the 
context of history.  I do not ―mince words‖ as Nietzsche says, in fact, I agree.  The philosophers of 
ancient Greece seem to have this position about creating a ―grand feeling of difference‖ with their 
treatment of slaves and non-Greek cultures (Nietzsche, pg 151). 
I also don't find myself at odds with these two moral categories (noble & slave) that 
Nietzsche lays out.  I understand how he could come to work morality into them.  Robert Solomon 
and Kathleen Higgins write that 
 
―Nietzsche does not remain at the same level of esoteric abstraction as his religious 
and moral antagonists.  What he does instead is dig under them.  What could be more 
effective against the self-righteousness pronouncements of some philosophers and 
theologians that an ad hominem argument that undermines their credibility, that 
reduces their rationality and piety to petty personal envy or indignation?‖ (Solomon 
and Higgins, pg 112). 
 
Nietzsche is clearly trying to be provocative about Christian morality, but I still see his point about 
the moralities (noble and slave) and their distinctions.  I think that they are valid categories, but I'm 
not sure if they are entirely comprehensive.  By this I mean that I don't think they fully encompass all 
positions or motivations (as Nietzsche describes them) that people can hold.  Nietzsche seems to be 
pigeon-holing all moral systems into these two categories. 
I disagree with Nietzsche that the ―grand feeling of difference‖ is necessary to reach ―ever 
greater distances within the soul itself‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151).  This difference must be made in order 
for philosophy to thrive.  I'm not saying that philosophy would never work (or that it hasn't) under 
Nietzsche's propositions, but that there are merits to the aspects of slave morality.  The slave morality 
doesn't heighten the individual in terms of self-understanding, but it does allow one to see others 
perspectives, and this in a way can help with self-understanding.  Empathy would work opposed to 
Nietzsche's idea as a kind of bridge between the ―gap‖ that he is talking about. This use of empathy 
could be used to better understand other humans, but Nietzsche disregards this quality.  To be fair 
Nietzsche does say ―the noble person will also help the unfortunate, but not, or not entirely, out of 
pity, but rather from the urgency created of the excess of power‖ (pg 154).  What this means is that 
someone with noble morality could express some of the same virtues that are supposed to be ―good‖ 
from the slave morality perspective, but for morally different reasons.  That is, someone with slave 
morality would have done this act out of empathy, while the person with noble morality would have 
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done it because it was his choice and not out of his pity.  So, even Nietzsche is admitting that 
empathetic actions are not entirely removed from his noble morality, even if they are done for 
different reasons. 
 I think that philosophy is possible with or without the ―grand feeling of difference‖ between 
the two moralities (Nietzsche, pg 151).  I think that having empathy for all people should be an 
important part of morality.  Even at the end of his life, Nietzsche could not avoid empathy.  As 
Rudiger Safranski writes ―On January 3, 1889, just after Nietzsche left his apartment, he caught sight 
of a carriage driver beating his horse on the Plazza Carlo Alberto.  Nietzsche, weeping, threw himself 
around the horse's neck to protect it.  He collapsed in compassion with the horse‖ (pg 316).  In this 
moment, Nietzsche felt pity for an animal, a creature supposedly unworthy of his pity, and in a 
situation where there was no need to give pity.  I think that this action shows that empathy is a part of 
human nature, and that it cannot entirely be denied, as Nietzsche tried to do.  I think that empathy 
should be a part of morality for this reason.  I don't think that the acts of slave morality should be 
done for the reasons that Nietzsche says they are done, but I don't think that things such as empathy 
or altruism should be excluded from morality because they were used in-part by what Nietzsche says 
is slave morality. 
In this paper I have explained aphorism 257 in Nietzsche's book Beyond good and evil by 
looking at it from the perspective of Nietzsche and what he would likely be thinking about at the time 
of writing.  I have explained and shown that Nietzsche uses language in a provocative way, using 
words that are practically insulting, in order to have the reader to think critically about Nietzsche's 
writing. I have also given my response to the aphorism by agreeing with Nietzsche about the origins 
of societies, but disagreeing with him on the account that it is impossible to achieve a philosophical 
society without a  ―grand feeling of difference‖ (Nietzsche, pg 151).  I do not think that this ―feeling 
of difference‖ is a requirement, and that there may be benefits to some of the aspects of what he 
describes as the slave morality. 
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